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Abstract
In this work we introduce the DP-auto-GAN framework for synthetic data generation, which com-
bines the low dimensional representation of autoencoders with the flexibility of Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs). This framework can be used to take in raw sensitive data, and privately train a model
for generating synthetic data that will satisfy the same statistical properties as the original data. This
learned model can be used to generate arbitrary amounts of publicly available synthetic data, which
can then be freely shared due to the post-processing guarantees of differential privacy. Our framework
is applicable to unlabeled mixed-type data, that may include binary, categorical, and real-valued data.
We implement this framework on both unlabeled binary data (MIMIC-III) and unlabeled mixed-type
data (ADULT). We also introduce new metrics for evaluating the quality of synthetic mixed-type data,
particularly in unsupervised settings.
1 Introduction
As data storage and analysis are becoming more cost effective, and data become more complex and unstruc-
tured, there is a growing need for sharing large datasets for research and learning purposes. This is in stark
contrast to the previous statistical model where a data curator would hold datasets and answer queries from
(potentially external) analysts. Sharing entire datasets allows analysts the freedom to perform their analyses
in-house with their own devices and toolkits, without having to pre-specify the analyses they wish to perform.
However, datasets are often proprietary or sensitive, and cannot be shared directly. This motivates the need
for synthetic data generation, where a new dataset is created that shares the same statistical properties as
the original data. These data may not be of a single type: all binary, all categorial, or all real-valued; instead
they may be of mixed-types, containing data of multiple types in a single dataset. These data may also be
unlabeled, requiring techniques for unsupervised learning, which is typically a more challenging task than
supervised learning on labeled data.
Privacy challenges naturally arise when sharing highly sensitive datasets about individuals. Ad hoc
anonymization techniques have repeatedly led to severe privacy violations when sharing “anonymized”
datasets. Notable examples include the Netflix Challenge [37], the AOL Search Logs [6], and Massachusetts
State Health data [40], where linkage attacks to publicly available auxiliary datasets were used to reidentify
individuals in the dataset. Even deep learning model have been shown to inadvertently memoize sensitive
personal information such as Social Security Numbers during training [9].
Differential privacy (DP) [16] (formally defined in Section 2) has become the de facto gold standard
of privacy in the computer science literature. Informally, it bounds the amount the extent to which an
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algorithm can depend on a single datapoint in its training set. This guarantee ensures that any differentially
privately learned models do not overfit to individuals in the database, and therefore cannot reveal sensitive
information about individuals. It is an information theoretic notion that does not rely on any assumptions
of an adversary’s computational power or auxiliary knowledge. Furthermore, it has been shown empirically
that training machine learning models with differential privacy protects against membership inference and
model inversion attacks [50, 9]. Differentially private algorithms have been deployed at large scale in practice
by organizations such as Apple, Google, Microsoft, Uber, and the U.S. Census Bureau.
Much of the prior work on differentially private synthetic data generation has been either theoretical
algorithms for highly structured classes of queries [8, 24] or based on deep generative models such as Gener-
ative Adversarial Networks (GANs) or autoencoders. These architectures have been primarily designed for
either all-binary or all-real-valued datasets, and have focused on the supervised setting, where datapoints
are labelled.
In this work we introduce the DP-auto-GAN framework, which combines the low dimensional representa-
tion of autoencoders with the flexibility of GANs. This framework can be used to take in raw sensitive data,
and privately train a model for generating synthetic data that should satisfy the same statistical properties
as the original data. This learned model can be used to generate arbitrary amounts of publicly available syn-
thetic data, which can then be freely shared due to the post-processing guarantees of differential privacy. We
implement this framework on both unlabeled binary data (for comparison with previous work) and unlabeled
mixed-type data. We also introduce new metrics for evaluating the quality of synthetic mixed-type data,
particularly in unsupervised settings, and empirically evaluate the performance our algorithm according to
these metrics on two datasets.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this work, we provide three main contributions: a new algorithmic framework for privately generating
synthetic data, new evaluation metrics for measuring the quality of synthetic data in unsupervised settings,
and empirical evaluations of our algorithmic framework using our new metrics, as well as standard metrics.
Algorithmic Framework. We propose a new data generation architecture which combines the versa-
tility of an autoencoder [29] with the recent success of GANs on complex data. Our model extends previous
autoencoder-based DP data generation [2, 12] by removing an assumption that the distribution of the latent
space follows a mixture of Gaussian distribution. Instead, we incorporate GANs into the autoencoder frame-
work so that the generator must learn the true latent distribution against the discriminator. We describe
the composition analysis of differential privacy when the training consists of optimizing both autoencoders
and GANs (with different noise parameters). Furthermore, in this analysis we halve the noise injected into
autoencoder from all existing works while provably maintaining the same mathematical privacy guarantee.
Unsupervised-Learning Evaluation Metric of Synthetic Data. We define several new metrics
that evaluate the performance of synthetic data compared to the original data when the data is of mixed-
type. Previous metrics in the literature are applicable only to all-binary or all-real-valued datasets. Our
new metrics generalize the previously used metrics [13, 55] from all-binary data to mixed-type by training
various learning models to predict each feature from the rest of the data in order to assess correlation between
features. In additional, our metrics do not require a particular feature to be specified as a label, and therefore
do not assume a supervised-learning nature of the data, as in much of the previous work does [41, 42, 28].
Empirical Results. We empirically comepare the performance of our algorithmic framework on the
MIMIC-III medical dataset [27] and UCI ADULT Census dataset [14] using previously studied metrics
in literature [18, 55]. Our experiments show that our algorithms perform better, and allow significantly
improved  values with  ≈ 1, compared to prior work [55] with  ≈ 200. We evaluate our synthetic data
using new quantitative and qualitative metrics, confirming that the performance of our algorithm remains
high even for small values of , corresponding to strong privacy guarantees. Our code is made publicly
available for future use and research.
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1.2 Related Work on Differentially Private Data Generation
Early work on differentially private synthetic data generation was focused primarily on theoretical algorithms
for solving the query release problem of privately and accurately answering a large class of pre-specified queries
on a given database. It was discovered that generating synthetic data on which the queries could be evaluated
allowed for better privacy composition than simply answering all the queries directly [8, 24, 25, 19]. Bayesian
inference has also been used for differentially private data generation [57, 44] by estimating the correlation
between features. See Surendra & Mohan [47] for a survey of techniques used in private synthetic data
generation through 2016.
In 2016, Abadi et al. [1] introduced a framework for training deep learning models with differential privacy.
Non-convex optimization, which is required when training deep models, can be made differentially private
by adding a Gaussian noise to a clipped (norm-bounded) gradient in each training step. Abadi et al. [1] also
introduced the moment accountant privacy analysis for private stochastic gradient descent, which provided
much tighter Gaussian-based privacy composition and allowed for significant improvements in accuracy over
previously used composition techniques, such as advanced composition [17]. The moment account was later
defined in terms of Renyi Differential Privacy (RDP) [34], which is a slight variant of differential privacy
designed for easy composition, particularly for differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD).
Much of the work that followed on private data generation used deep (neural-network-based) generative
models to generate synthetic data, and can be broadly categorized into two types: autoencoder-based and
GAN-based. Our algorithmic framework is the first to combine both DP GANs and autoencoders into one
framework.
Differentially Private Autoencoder-Based Models. A variational autoencoder (VaE) [29] is a gen-
erative model that compresses high-dimensional data to a smaller space called latent space. The compression
is commonly achieved through deep models and can be differentially privately trained [12, 3]. VaE makes
the (often unrealistic) assumption that the latent distribution is Gaussian. Acs et al. [3] uses Restricted
Boltzmann machine (RBM) to learn the latent Gaussian distribution, and Abay et al. [2] uses expectation
maximization to learn a Gaussian mixture. Our work extends this line of work by additionally incorporating
the generative model GANs which have also been shown to be successful in learning latent distributions.
Differentially Private GANs. GANs are a generative model proposed by Goodfellow et al. [20] that
have been shown success in generating several different types of data [36, 45, 46, 26, 30, 53]. As with
other deep models, GANs can be trained privately using the aforementioned private stochastic gradient
descent (formally introduced in Section 2.1). See Appendix C.1 for additional related work on performance
improvements for differentially private training of deep models.
Variants of DP GANs have been used for synthetic data generation, including the Wasserstein GAN
(WGAN) [5, 22] and DP-WGAN [4, 50] that use a Wasserstein-distance-based loss function in training
[5, 22, 4, 50]; the conditional GAN (CGAN) [35] and DP-CGAN [49] that operate in a supervised (labeled)
setting and use labels as auxiliary information in training; and Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles
(PATE) [41, 42] for the semi-supervised setting of multi-label classification when some unlabelled public
data are available (or PATEGAN [28] when no public data are available). Our work focuses on unsupervised
setting where data are unlabeled, and no (relevant) labeled public data are available.
These existing works in differentially private synthetic data generation are summarized in Table 1.
Differentially Private Generation of Mixed-Type Data. Next we describe the three most relevant
recent works on privately generating synthetic data of mixed type. Abay et al. [2] consider the problem of
generating mixed-type labeled data with k possible labels. Their algorithm, DP-SYN, partitions the dataset
into k sets based on the labels and trains a DP autoencoder on each partition. Then a DP expectation
maximization (DP-EM) algorithm of Park et al. [43] is used to learn the distribution in the latent space of
encoded data of the given label-class. The main workhorse, DM-EM algorithm, is designed and analyzed
for Gaussian mixture models and more general factor analysis models. Chen et al. [12] works in the same
setting, but replaces the DP autoencoder and DP-EM with a DP variational autoencoder (DP-VaE). Their
algorithm assumes that the mapping from real data to the Gaussian distribution can be efficiently learned by
the encoder. Finally, Frigerio et al. [18] used a Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) to generate differentially private
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Table 1: Algorithmic frameworks for differentially private synthetic data generation. Our new algorithmic
framework (in bold) is the first to combine both DP GANs and autoencoders into one framework by using
GANs to learn a generative model in the latent space.
Types
Algorithmic framework
Main architecture Variants
Deep
genera-
tive
models
DPGAN [1]
PATEGAN [28]
DP Wasserstein GAN [4]
DP Conditional GAN [49]
Gumbel-softmax for categorical data [18]
Autoencoder
DP-VaE [12, 3]
RBM generative models in latent space [3]
Mixture of Gaussian model in latent space [2]
Autoencoder and DPGAN (ours)
Other
models
SmallDB [8], PMW [24], MWEM [25], DualQuery [19], DataSynthe-
sizer [44], PrivBayes [57]
mixed-type synthetic data. This type of GAN uses a Wasserstein-distance-based loss function in training.
Their algorithmic framework privatized the WGAN using DP-SGD, similar to the previous approaches for
image datasets [58, 55]. The methodology of Frigerio et al. [18] for generating mixed-type synthetic data
involved two main ingredients: changing discrete (categorical) data to binary data using one-hot encoding,
and adding an output softmax layer to the WGAN generator for every discrete variable.
Our framework is distinct from these three approaches. We use a differentially private autoencoder
which, unlike DP-VaE of Chen et al. [12], does not require mapping data to a Gaussian distribution. This
allows us to reduce the dimension of the problem handled by the WGAN, hence escaping the issues of high-
dimensionality from the one-hot encoding of Frigerio et al. [18]. We also use DP-GAN, replacing DP-EM in
Abay et al. [2], for learning distributions in the latent encoded space.
NIST Differential Privacy Synthetic Data Challenge. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) recently hosted a challenge to find methods for privately generating synthetic mixed-
type data [38], using excerpts from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample (IPUMS) of the 1940 U.S.
Census Data as training and test datasets. Four of the winning solutions have been made publicly available
with open-source code [39]. However, all of these approaches are highly tailored to the specific datasets
and evaluation metrics used in the challenge, including specialized data pre-processing methods and hard-
coding details of the dataset in the algorithm. As a result, they do not provide general-purpose methods for
differentially private synthetic data generation, and it would be inappropriate–if not impossible–to use any
of these algorithms as baseline for other datasets such as ones we consider in this paper.
Evaluation Metrics for Synthetic Data. Various evaluation metrics have been considered in the lit-
erature to quantify the quality of the synthetic data (see Charest [10] for a survey). The metrics can be
broadly categorized into two groups: supervised and unsupervised. Supervised evaluation metrics are used
when there are clear distinctions between features and labels of the dataset, e.g., for healthcare applications,
a person’s disease status is a natural label. In these settings, a predictive model is typically trained on the
synthetic data, and its accuracy is measured with respect to the real (test) dataset. Unsupervised evaluation
metrics are used when no feature of the data can be decisively termed as a label. Recently proposed metrics
include dimension-wise probability for binary data [13], which compares the marginal distribution of real
and synthetic data on each individual feature, and dimension-wise prediction which measures how closely
synthetic data captures relationships between features in the real data. This metric was proposed for binary
data, and we extend it here to mixed-type data. Recently, NIST [38] used a 3-way marginal evaluation
metric which used three random features of the real and synthetic datasets to compute the total variation
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distance as a statistical score. See Appendix C.2 for more details on both categories of metrics, including
Table 2 which summarizes the metrics’ applicability to various data types.
2 Preliminaries on Differential Privacy
In the setting of differential privacy, a dataset X consists of m individuals’ sensitive information, and two
datasets are neighbors if one can be obtained from the other by the addition or deletion of one datapoint.
Differential privacy requires that an algorithm produce similar outputs on neighboring datasets, thus ensuring
that the output does not overfit to its input dataset, and that the algorithm learns from the population but
not from the individuals.
Definition 1 (Differential privacy [16]). For , δ > 0, an algorithm M is (, δ)-differentially private if for
any pair of neighboring databases X,X ′ and any subset S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(X) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[M(X ′) ∈ S] + δ.
A smaller value of  implies stronger privacy guarantees (as the constraint above binds more tightly), but
usually corresponds with decreased accuracy, relative to non-private algorithms or the same algorithm run
with a larger value of . Differential privacy is typically achieved by adding random noise that scales with
the sensitivity of the computation being performed, which is the maximum change in the output value that
can be caused by changing a single entry. Differential privacy has strong composition guarantees, meaning
that the privacy parameters degrade gracefully as additional algorithms are run on the same dataset. It also
has a post-processing guarantee, meaning that any function of a differentially private output will maintain
the same privacy guarantees.
2.1 Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD)
Training deep learning models reduces to minimizing some (empirical) loss function f(X; θ) := 1m
∑m
i=1 f(xi; θ)
on a dataset X = {xi ∈ Rn}mi=1. Typically f is a nonconvex function, and a common method to minimize f
is by iteratively performing stochastic gradient descent (SGD) on a batch B of sampled data points:
B ← BatchSample(X)
θ ← θ − η · 1|B|
∑
i∈B ∇θf(xi, θ) (1)
The size of B is typically fixed as a moderate number to ensure quick computation of gradient, while
maintaining that 1|B|
∑
i∈B ∇f(xi, θ) is a good estimate of true gradient ∇θf(X; θ).
To make SGD private, Abadi et al. [1] proposed to first clip the gradient of each sample to ensure the
`2-norm is at most C:
Clip(x,C) := x ·min (1, C/||x||2) .
Then a multivariate Gaussian noise parametrized by noise multiplier ψ is added before taking an average
across the batch, leading to noisy-clipped-averaged gradient estimate g:
g ← 1|B|
(∑
i∈B Clip(∇θf(xi, θ), C) +N (0, C2ψ2I)
)
.
The quantity g is now private and can be used for the descent step θ ← θ − η · g in place of Equation 1.
Performance improvements. In general, the descent step can be performed using other optimization
methods—such as Adam or RMSProp—in a private manner, by replacing the gradient value with g in
each step. Also, one does not need to clip the individual gradients, but can instead clip the gradient of a
group of datapoints, called a microbatch [32]. Mathematically, the batch B is partitioned into microbatches
B1, . . . , Bk each of size r, and the gradient clipping is performed on the average of each microbatch:
g ← 1
k
(∑k
i=1 Clip(∇θf(XBi , θ), C) +N (0, C2ψ2I)
)
.
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Standard DP-SGD corresponds to setting r = 1, but setting higher values of r (while holding |B| fixed)
significantly decreases the runtime and reduces the accuracy, and does not impact privacy significantly for
large dataset. Other clipping strategies have also been suggested. We refer the interested reader to [32] and
Appendix C.1 for more details of clipping and other optimization strategies.
The improved moment accountant privacy analysis by [1] (which has been implemented in Google [21]
and is widely used in practice) obtains a tighter privacy bound when data are subsampled, as in SGD. This
analysis requires independently sampling each datapoint with a fixed probability q in each step. Additional
details are also given in Appendix C.1.
The DP-SGD framework (Algorithm 1) is generically applicable to private non-convex optimization. In
our proposed model, we use this framework to train the autoencoder and GAN.
Algorithm 1 DP-SGD (one iteration step)
1: parameter input: Dataset X = {xi}mi=1, deep learning model parameter θ, learning rate η, loss function
f , optimization method Optim, batch sampling rate q (for the batch expectation size b = qm), clipping
norm C, noise multiplier ψ, microbatch size r
2: goal: differentially privately train one step of the model parametrized by θ with Optim
3: procedure DP-SGD
4: procedure SampleBatch(X, q)
5: B ← {}
6: for i = 1 . . .m do
7: Add xi to B with probability q
return B
8: Partition B into B1, . . . , Bk each of size r (ignoring the dividend)
9: kˆ ← qmr . an estimate of k
10: g ← 1
kˆ
(∑k
i=1 Clip(∇θf(XBi , θ), C) +N (0, C2ψ2I)
)
11: θ ← Optim(θ, g, η)
2.2 Renyi Differential Privacy Accountant
A variant notion of differential privacy, known as Renyi Differential Privacy (RDP) [34], is often used to
analyze privacy for DP-SGD. A randomized mechanism M is (α, )-RDP if for all neighboring databases
X,X ′ that differ in at most one entry,
RDP (α) := Dα(M(X)||M(X ′)) ≤ ,
where Dα(P ||Q) := 1α−1 logEx∼X
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)α
is the Renyi divergence or Renyi entropy of order α between
two distributions P and Q. Renyi divergence is better tailored to tightly capture the privacy loss from
the Gaussian mechanism that is used in DG-SGD, and is a common analysis tool for DP-SGD literature.
To compute the final (, δ)-differential privacy parameters from iterative runs of DP-SGD, one must first
compute the subsampled Renyi Divergence, then compose privacy under RDP, and then convert the RDP
guarantee into DP.
Step 1: Subsampled Renyi Divergence. Given sampling rate q and noise multiplier ψ, one can
obtain RDP privacy parameters as a function of α ≥ 1 for one run of DP-SGD [34]. We denote this function
by RDPT=1(·), which will depend on q and ψ.
Step 2: Composition of RDP. When DP-SGD is run iteratively, we can compose the Renyi privacy
parameter across all runs using the following proposition.
Proposition 2 ([34]). If M1,M2 respectively satisfy (α, 1), (α, 2)-RDP for α ≥ 1, then the composition
of two mechanisms (M2(X),M1(X)) satisfies (α, 1 + 2)-RDP.
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Hence, we can compute RDP privacy parameters for T iterations of DP-SGD asRDP-Account(T, q,ψ) :=
T · RDPT=1(·).
Step 3: Conversion to (, δ)-DP. After obtaining an expression for the overall RDP privacy parameter
values, any (α, )-RDP guarantee can be converted into (, δ)-DP.
Proposition 3 ([34]). IfM satisfies (α, )-RDP for α > 1, then for all δ > 0,M satisfies (+ log 1/δα−1 , δ)-DP.
Since the  privacy parameter of RDP is also a function of α, this last step involves optimizing for the α
that achieves smallest privacy parameter in Proposition 3.
3 Algorithmic Framework
The overview of our algorithmic framework DP-auto-GAN is shown in Figure 1, and the full details are given
in Algorithm 2. Details of subroutines in Algorithm 2 can be found in Appendix A.
The algorithm takes in m raw data points, and pre-processes these points into m vectors x1, . . . , xm ∈ Rn
to be read by DP-auto-GAN, where usually n is very large. For example, categorical data may be pre-
processed using one-hot encoding, or text may be converted into numerical values. Similarly, the output of
DP-auto-GAN can be post-processed from Rn back to the data’s original form. We assume that this pre-
and post-processing can done based on public knowledge, such as possible categories for qualitative features
and reasonable bounds on quantitative features, and therefore does not require privacy.
Figure 1: The summary of our DP-auto-GAN algorithmic framework. Pre- and post-processing (in black)
are assumed to be public knowledge. Encoder and generator (in green) are trained without noise injection,
whereas decoder and discriminator (in yellow) are trained with noise. The four red arrows indicate how data
are forwarded for each training: autoencoder training, generator training, and discriminator training. After
training, the generator and decoder (but not encoder) are released to the public to generate synthetic data.
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Within the DP-auto-GAN, there are two main components: the autoencoder and the GAN. The autoen-
coder serves to reduce the dimensionality of the data before it is fed into the GAN. The GAN consists of a
generator that takes in noise z sampled from distribution Z and produces Gw(z) ∈ Rd, and a discriminator
Dy(·) : Rn → {0, 1}. Because of the autoencoder, the generator only needs to synthesize data based on the
latent distribution Rd, which is a much easier task than synthesizing in the original high-dimensional space
Rn. Both components of our architecture, as well as our algorithm’s overall privacy guarantee, are described
in the remainder of this section.
Algorithm 2 DPautoGAN (full procedure)
1: architecture input: Sensitive dataset D ∈ Xm where X is the (raw) data universe, preprocessed data
dimension n, latent space dimension d, preprocessing function Pre : X → Rn, post-processing func-
tion Post : Rn → X , encoder architecture Enφ : Rn → Rd parameterized by φ, decoder architecture
Deθ : Rd → Rn parameterized by θ, generator’s noise distribution Z on sample space Ω(Z), genera-
tor architecture Gw : Ω(Z) → Rd parameterized by w, discriminator architecture Dy : Rn → {0, 1}
parameterized by y.
2: autoencoder training parameters: Learning rate η1, number of iteration rounds (or optimization
steps) T1, loss function Lauto, optimization method Optimauto batch sampling rate q1 (for batch expec-
tation size b1 = q1m), clipping norm C1, noise multiplier ψ1, microbatch size r1
3: generator training parameters: Learning rate η2, batch size b2, loss function LG, optimization
method OptimG, number of generator iteration rounds (or optimization steps) T2
4: discriminator training parameters: Learning rate η3, number of discriminator iterations per gen-
erator step tD, loss function LD, optimization method OptimD, batch sampling rate q3 (for batch
expectation size b3 = q3m), clipping norm C3, noise multiplier ψ3, microbatch size r3
5: privacy parameter δ > 0
6: procedure DPautoGAN
7: X ← Pre(D)
8: Initialize φ, θ, w, y for Enφ, Deθ, Gw, Dy
. Phase 1: autoencoder training
9: for t = 1 . . . T1 do
10: DPTrainauto(X, En, De, autoencoder training parameters)
. Phase 2: GAN training
11: for t = 1 . . . T2 do
12: for j = 1 . . . tD do . (privately) train Dy for tD iterations
13: DPTrainDiscriminator(X, Z, G,De, D, discriminator training parameters)
14: TrainGenerator(Z,G,De,D, generator training parameters)
. Privacy accounting
15: RDPauto(·)← RDP-Account(T1, q1, ψ1, r1)
16: RDPD(·)← RDP-Account(T2 · tD, q3, ψ3, r3)
17: ←Get-Eps(RDPauto(·) + RDPD(·))
18: return model (Gw, Deθ), privacy (, δ)
3.1 Autoencoder Training
The autoencoder consists of the encoder Enφ(·) : Rn → Rd and decoder Deθ(·) : Rd → Rn parametrized
by edge weights φ, θ, respectively. The architecture of the autoencoder assumes that high-dimensional data
xi ∈ Rn can be represented compactly in low-dimensional space Rd, also called latent space. The encoder
Enφ is trained to find such low-dimensional representations. We also need the decoder, Deθ, to map this
point Enφ(xi) in the latent space back to xi. A measure of the information preserved in this process is the
error between the decoder’s image and the original xi. Thus a good autoencoder should minimize the distance
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dist(Deθ(Enφ(xi)), xi) for each datapoint xi and the appropriate distance function dist. Our autoencoder
uses binary cross entropy loss: dist(x, y) = −∑nj=1 y(j) log(x(j))−∑nj=1(1− y(j)) log(1−x(j)) (where x(j) is
the jth coordinate of x ∈ Rn).
This also motivates a definition of a (true) loss function Ex∼ZX [dist(Deθ(Enφ(xi)), xi)] when data are
drawn independently from an underlying distribution ZX . The corresponding empirical loss function when
we have an access to sample {xi}mi=1 is
Lauto(φ, θ) :=
∑m
i=1 dist(Deθ(Enφ(xi)), xi). (2)
The task of finding a good autoencoder reduces to optimizing φ and θ to yield small empirical loss as in
Equation 2.
We minimize Equation 2 privately using DP-SGD (described in Section 2.1). Our approach differs from
previous work on private training of autoencoders [12, 3, 2] by not adding noise to the encoder during DP-
SGD, whereas previous work adds noise to both the encoder and decoder. This improves performance by
reducing the noise injected into the model by half, while still maintaining the same privacy guarantee (see
Proposition 5). The full description of our autoencoder training is given in Algorithm 3 in Appendix A. In
our DP-auto-GAN framework, the autoencoder is trained first until completion, and is then fixed for the
second phase of training GAN.
3.2 GAN Training
A GAN consists of the generator Gw and discriminator Dy : Rn → {0, 1}, parameterized respectively by edge
weights w and y. The aim of the generator Gw is to synthesize (fake) data similar to the real dataset, while
the aim of discriminator is to determine whether an input xi is from the generator’s synthesized data (and
assigning label Dy(xi) = 0) or is real data (and assigning label Dy(xi) = 1). The generator is seeded with a
random noise z ∼ Z that contains no information about real dataset, such as a multivariate Gaussian vector,
and aims to generate a distribution Gw(z) that is hard for Dy is distinguish from the real data. Hence,
the generator wants to minimize the probability that Dy makes a correct guess, Ez∼Z [1 −Dy(Gw(z))]. At
the same time, the discriminator wants to maximize its probability of correct guess when the data is fake
Ez∼Z [1−Dy(Gw(z))] and when the data is real Ex∼ZX [Dy(x)].
We generalize the output of Dy to a continuous range [0, 1], with the value indicating the confidence that a
sample is real. We use the zero-sum objective for the discriminator and generator proposed by Arjovsky et al.
[5] and motivated by the Wasserstein distance of two distributions. Although their proposed Wasserstein
objective cannot be computed exactly, it can be approximated by optimizing the objective:
miny maxw O(y, w) := Ex∼ZX [Dy(x)]− Ez∼Z [Dy(Gw(z))]. (3)
We optimize Equation 3 privately using the DP-SGD framework described in Section 2.1. We differ from
prior work on DP GANs in that our generator Gw(·) outputs data Gw(z) in latent space Rd which needs to
be decoded to De(Gw(z)) before being fed into the discriminator Dy(z). The gradient ∇wGw is obtained
by backpropagation through one more component En(·). Hence, the training of generator remains totally
private because the additional component En(·) is fixed and never accesses the private data. The full
description of our GAN training is given in Algorithm 5 in the Appendix A.
At the end of the two-phase training (including autoencoder and GAN), the noise distribution Z, trained
generator Gw(·), and trained decoder De(·) are released to the public. The public can then generate synthetic
data by sampling z ∼ Z to obtain a synthesized datapoint En(Gy(z)) repeatedly to obtain a synthetic dataset
of any desired size.
3.3 Privacy Accounting
Our autoencoder and GAN are trained privately by adding noise to the encoder and discriminator. Since the
generator only accesses data through the discriminator’s (privatized) output, then the trained parameters of
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generator are also private by post-processing guarantees of differential privacy. Finally, we release the priva-
tized decoder and generator, together with generator’s noise distribution Z and post-processing procedure,
both of which are assumed to be public knowledge.
The privacy accounting is therefore required for the two parts that access real data X: training the
autoencoder and the discriminator. In each training procedure, we apply the RDP accountant described in
Section 2.2 to analyze privacy of the DP-SGD training algorithm, to compute final (, δ)-DP bound. Our
application of the RDP accountant diverges from the previous literature in two main ways.
First, we do not add noise to encoder during the autoencoder training, which is contrary to prior work that
adds noise to both the encoder and decoder. Our approach of not adding noise to the encoder does not affect
the algorithms’ overall privacy guarantees. This claim is stated formally in the following corollary, which
follows immediately by instantiating Proposition 5 with the RDP privacy accountant and then composing
RDP using Proposition 2.
Corollary 4. If the decoder in DP-auto-GAN is trained privately with RDP privacy parameter RDPauto(·)
(the encoder can be trained non-privately) and the discriminator in DP-auto-GAN is trained with RDP
privacy parameter RDPD(·), then DP-auto-GAN is RDP with privacy parameter RDPauto(·)+RDPD(·).
Second, the privacy analysis must account for two phases of training, usually with different privacy
parameters (due to different batch sampling rates, noise, and number of iterations). One obvious solution
is to calculate the desired (, δ)-DP parameter obtained from each phase and compose them to obtain
(1 + 2, δ1 + δ2)-DP using basic composition of differential privacy [16]. However, we can obtain a tighter
privacy bound by composing the privacy at the Renyi Divergence level before translating Renyi Divergence
into (, δ)-DP. In other words, we first apply Proposition 2 to compute RDP(·) of two-phase training before
applying Proposition 3 to translate RDP into DP, as analogous to the approach described in Section 2.2 for
RDP composition for DP-SGD. This is the approach highlighted in Corollary 4. In practice, this reduces
the privacy parameter  by about 30%.
4 Evaluation Metrics
In this section, we discuss the evaluation metrics that we use in the experiments (described in Section 5) to
empirically measure the quality of the synthetic data. Some of these metrics have been used in the literature,
while many are novel contributions in this work. The evaluation metrics are summarized in Table 2; our
contributions are in bold.
For the first two metrics described below, the dataset should be partitioned into a training set R ∈ Rm1×n
and testing set T ∈ Rm2×n, where m = m1 +m2 is the total number of samples the real data, and n is the
number of features in the data. After training the DP-auto-GAN, we use it to create a synthetic dataset
S ∈ Rm3×n, for sufficiently large m3.
Dimension-wise probability. This metric is used when the entire dataset is binary, and it serves as a
basic sanity check to verify whether DP-auto-GAN has correctly learned the marginal distribution of each
feature. Specifically, it compares the proportion of 1’s (which can be thought of as estimators of Bernoulli
success probability) in each feature of the training set R and synthetic dataset S.
Dimension-wise prediction. This metric evaluates whether DP-auto-GAN has correctly learned the
relationships between features. For the k-th feature of training set R and synthetic dataset S, we choose
yRk ∈ Rm1 and ySk ∈ Rm3 as labels of a classification or regression task based on the type of that feature,
and the remaining features R−k and S−k are used for prediction. We train either a classification or regression
model and measure goodness of fit based on the model’s accuracy using the following well known metrics:
1. Area under the ROC curve (AUROC) score and F1 score for classification: The F1 score of a classifier
is defined as F1 :=
2×precision×recall
precision+recall , where precision is ratio of true positives to true and false positives,
and recall is ratio of true positives to total true positives (i.e., true positives plus false negatives).
AUROC score is a graphical measure capturing the area under ROC (receiver operating characteristic)
curve, and is only intended for binary data. Both metrics take values in interval [0, 1] with larger values
implying good fit.
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Table 2: Summary of evaluation metrics in DP synthetic data generation. We list applicability of each metric
to each of the data type. Parts in bold are our new contributions. Evaluation methods with asterisk
* are predictive-model-specific, and their applicability therefore depends on types of data that the chosen
predictive model is appropriate for. Methods with asterisks ** are equipped with any any distributional
distance of choice such as Wasserstein distance.
TYPES EVALUATION METHODS DATA TYPES
Binary Categorical Regression
Supervised
Label prediction* [12, 2, 18] Yes Yes Yes
Predictive model ranking* [28] Yes Yes Yes
Unsupervised,
prediction-based
Dimension-wise prediction plot* Yes ([13],
ours)
Yes Yes
Unsupervised,
distributional-
distance-based
Dimension-wise probability plot
[13]
Yes No No
3-way feature marginal, total vari-
ation distance [38]
Yes Yes Yes
k-way feature marginal** Yes Yes Yes
k-way PCA marginal** Yes Yes Yes
Distributional distance** Yes Yes Yes
Unsupervised,
qualitative
1-way feature marginal (his-
togram)
Yes Yes Yes
2-way PCA marginal (data vi-
sualization)
Yes Yes Yes
2. R2 score for regression: The R2 score is defined as 1 −
∑
(yi − ŷi)2∑
(yi − y)2 , where yi is the true label, ŷi is
the predicted label, and y is the mean of the true labels. This is a popular metric used to measure
goodness of fit as well as future prediction accuracy for regression.
We also propose following novel evaluation metrics.
1-way feature marginal. This metric works as a sanity check for real features. We compute histograms
for the feature interest of both real and synthetic data. The quality of the synthetic data with respect to
this metric can be evaluated qualitatively through visual comparison of the histograms on real and synthetic
data. This can be extended to k-way feature marginals and made into a quantitative measure by adding a
distance measure between the histograms.
2-way PCA marginal. This metric generalizes the 3-way marginal score used in NIST [38]. In partic-
ular, we compute principle components of the original data and evaluate a projection operator for first two
principle components. Let us denote P ∈ Rn×2 as the projection matrix such that R = RP is the projection
on first two principle components of R. Then we evaluate projection of synthetic data S = SP and scatter-
plot 2-D points in R and S for visual evaluation. For quantitative evaluation, we also compute Wasserstein
distance between R and S. In the simulations described in Section 5, we used Wasserstein distance since
we optimize for the WGAN objective, but any distributional divergence metric can be used. This approach
can also be extended to k-way marginals by making the projection matrix P ∈ Rn×2 for the first k principle
components.
Distributional distance. In this metric, we first compute the Wasserstein distance W2(R,S) between
the entire real and synthetic datasets R,S. The Wasserstein score is then defined as
Wscore(R,S) := 1− W2(R,S)maxx,y∈X ||x−y||22 ,
where the Wasserstein distance is normalized by the maximum distance possible of two datapoints in data
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universe X . To compute the Wasserstein score on k-way marginal PCA projection P , we normalize the score
with additional term
√
v, where v is the explained variance of P :
Wscore(R¯, S¯, P ) := 1− W2(R¯,S¯)√vmaxx,y∈X ||x−y||22 .
For more details about implementation of these new evaluation metrics, their generalizations and rela-
tionships among them, we refer the reader to Appendix C.2.
5 Experiments
In this section we present details of our datasets and show empirical results of our experiments. Throughout
our experiments, we fix δ = 10−5 for training DP-auto-GAN and show results for different values of 
including  = ∞ (i.e., non-private GAN) which serves as a benchmark. We also compare our results with
existing works in the literature where relevant. Details of hyper-parameters and architecture can be found in
the appendix. The code of our implementation is available at https://github.com/DPautoGAN/DPautoGAN.
5.1 Binary Data
First, we consider the MIMIC-III dataset [27] which is a publicly available dataset consisting of medical
records of 46K intensive care unit (ICU) patients over 11 years old. This is a binary dataset with 1071
features.
Even though our DP-auto-GAN framework can handle mixed-type data, we first evaluate it on the
MIMIC-III dataset, which is all binary, since this dataset has been used in similar non-private [13] and
private [55] GAN frameworks. We use the same evaluation metrics used in these papers. First we plot
dimension-wise probability for DP-auto-GAN run on this dataset.
(a)  =∞ (b)  = 3.11865 (c)  = 1.27655 (d)  = 0.94145
Figure 2: Dimension-wise probability scatterplots for different values of . For each point in the plot
represents one of the 1071 features in MIMIC-III dataset. The x and y coordinates of each point are the
proportion of 1 in real and synthetic datasets of a feature, respectively. The line y = x is shown in each plot.
As shown in Figure 2, the proportion of 1’s in the marginal distribution for is similar on the real and
synthetic datasets for  = ∞ and  = 3.11865, because nearly all points fall close to the line y = x. The
performance of DP-auto-GAN is affected marginally for  = 1.27655 which can be noticed by increased
variance of points along line y = x. For  = 0.94145, DP-auto-GAN is unable to accurately learn the
marginal distributions in the real data, as many of the features in the synthetic dataset have much higher
proportion of 0’s. This trend in the performance is expected for smaller values of , which correspond to
stronger privacy guarantees. We note that our results are significantly stronger than the ones obtained in
[55] with  ∈ [96.5, 231] because we obtain dramatically better performance with  values that are two orders
of magnitude smaller. For visual performance comparison, see Figures 4 and 5 of [55].
Figure 3 shows the plots of dimension-wise prediction using DP-auto-GAN for different values of . As
shown in the figure, for  = ∞, many points are concentrated along the lower side of line y = x, which
indicates that the AUROC score of the real dataset is only marginally higher than that of the synthetic
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(a)  =∞ (b)  = 3.11865 (c)  = 1.27655 (d)  = 0.94145
Figure 3: Dimension-wise prediction scatterplots for different values of . Each point represents one of 1071
features in MIMIC-III dataset. For each point, the x and y coordinates represent the AUROC score of a
logistic regression classifier trained on real and synthetic datasets, respectively. The line y = x corresponds
to the ideal performance.
dataset. For  = 3.11865 and  = 1.27655, there is a gradual shift downwards relative to the line y = x, with
larger variance in the plotted points. This indicates that AUROC scores of real and synthetic data shows
more difference for smaller values of . The plot for  = 0.94145 shows the same trend, but has noticeably
fewer datapoints plotted. This is because many features in the synthetic data under this small  value have
a high proportion of 0’s, so the logistic regression classifier trained on these features uniformly outputs 0 on
the hold-out test dataset T . In such cases, the AUROC score is 1/2 by default and as such, does not have
any meaning, so we drop those features from the plot. The plots of dimension-wise prediction with these
points included are given in Figure 7 in Appendix B.2, along with training specifications of DP-auto-GAN
on the MIMIC-III dataset in Appendix B.1.
5.2 Mixed Data
Second, we consider the ADULT dataset [14] which is an extract of the U.S. Census and contains information
about working adults. This dataset has 14 features out of which 10 features are categorical and four are
real-valued.
(a)  =∞ (b)  = 1.5 (c)  = 1 (d)  = 0.8
Figure 4: Dimension-wise prediction scatterplot for different values of . Each point represents one of 14
features in the ADULT dataset. Blue points and single green points correspond to categorical features, and
are plotted according to F1 score. Red points correspond to real-valued features, and we plot R
2 score when
it is positive. For each point, x and y coordinate represents relevant score evaluated on real and synthetic
datasets, respectively.
Figure 4 shows the dimension-wise prediction plot of DP-auto-GAN on this dataset. For categorical
features (represented by blue points and a single green point), we use random forest classifier in order to
compare our result with [18]. For real-valued features (represented by red points), we used a lasso regression
model. The green point corresponds to the salary feature of the data, which is real-valued but treated as
binary, based on the condition > $50k, which is similarly used as a binary label in [18]. We use F1 score
as our classification accuracy measure for categorical features in in Figure 4, and we use R2 score as our
regression accuracy for real-valued features. The F1 score is preferred over AUROC score for the ADULT
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Table 3: Accuracy scores of prediction on salary feature evaluated on different  values.
 value Real dataset ∞ 7 3 1.5 1 0.8
Accuracy (ours) 86.63% 79.18% 77.86% 76.92% 77.7%
Accuracy ([18]) 77.2% 76.7% 76.0% 75.3%
dataset because it has many non-binary features where AUROC cannot be used. Each point in Figure 4
corresponds to one feature, and the x and y coordinates respectively show the accuracy score on the real
data and the synthetic data.
Similar to the MIMIC-III dataset, we see that for large values of , points are scattered close to y = x line,
and as  gets smaller, points gradually shift downward implying, that accuracy of synthetic data deceases
with stronger privacy guarantees. For the salary feature, we also compute accuracy scores for comparison
with [18]. In Table 3, we report the accuracy of each synthetic dataset as well as benchmark accuracy. The
results reported in [18] use  = 3, 7,∞, whereas our algorithms used parameter values  = 0.8, 1, 1.5,∞.
We see that our accuracy guarantees are higher than those of [18] with smaller  values, and DP-auto-GAN
achieved higher accuracy in the non-private setting.
Note that in the ADULT dataset, we have four real-valued features (age, capital gain, capital loss, and
hours worked per week), but there are not four red points in each plot of Figure 4. While AUROC for the
binary features is always supported on [0, 1], the R2 score for real-valued features can be negative if the
predictive model is poor, and these values fell outside the range of Figure 4. As  decreased—corresponding
to stronger privacy and hence diminished accuracy of performance—fewer red points are observed in Figure
4. We were not able to find a regression model with good fit (as measured by R2 score) for the latter three
features (capital gain, capital loss, and hours worked per week) in terms of the other features even on the
real data. We attempted several different approaches, ranging from simple regression models such as lasso to
complex models such as neural networks, and all had a low R2 score on both the real and synthetic data. The
capital gain and capital loss attributes are inherently hard to predict because the data are sparse (mostly
zero) in these attributes.
Since the R2 did not prove to be a good metric for these features, we instead plotted 1-way fea-
ture marginal histograms for each of these three remaining features to check whether the marginal dis-
tribution was learned correctly. These 1-way histograms are shown in Figure 5. The figure shows that
DP-auto-GAN identifies the marginal distribution of capital gain and capital loss quite well, and it does
reasonably well on the hours-per-week feature.
In order to understand combined performance of all features, we use two metrics. First, we show the
qualitative results from 2-way PCA marginal score in Figure 6. A close qualitative inspection of plots clearly
shows the similarities of trends between the plots for real dataset and for different values of , as low as  = 1.
We can turn this qualitative measure into a quantitative one by evaluating the Wasserstein distributional
distance between the synthetic and real data, shown in Table 4. We measure this distance both on the
2-way PCA marginal distribution and on the full dataset. Computing exact Wasserstein distance can be
computationally expensive; in practice, we uniformly sample datapoints from real and synthetic (projected)
data to compute Wasserstein distance. This sampling and distance computation are repeated several times,
and the average of the distances over all iterations is used as the final Wasserstein distance.
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(a) Capital gain,  =∞ (b)  = 1.5 (c)  = 1 (d)  = 0.8
(e) Capital loss,  =∞ (f)  = 1.5 (g)  = 1 (h)  = 0.8
(i) Hours per week,  =∞ (j)  = 1.5 (k)  = 1 (l)  = 0.8
Figure 5: 1-way histogram for different values of . Three rows correspond to capital gain, capital loss
and weekly work-hours. Blue corresponds to the histogram of the real dataset, and red corresponds to the
histogram of the synthetic dataset generated with the indicated . The overlap of both histograms is purple.
(a) Real data (b)  =∞ (c)  = 1.5 (d)  = 1 (e)  = 0.8
Figure 6: Scatterplot of projection of given dataset on first two principle component of the real dataset
Table 4: Wasserstein distance scores on 2-way PCA marginals and on the whole dataset for different  values.
Method  2-way PCA score Whole-data score
DP-auto-GAN 1.5 44.36% 60.84%
DP-auto-GAN 1 41.17% 60.53%
DP-auto-GAN 0.8 19.25% 60.51%
6 Conclusion
We proposed a method called DP-auto-GAN for differentially private synthetic data generation. This method
combines the efficient low-dimensional representation of variational autoencoders with the flexibility and
versatility of GANs. Relative to prior work on differentially private autoencoders, we show that it suffices
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to only train the decoder privately, which allows the noise from privacy to be reduced by a factor of 2.
We show how this framework can be used to privately learn a model for generating synthetic data, and
once trained, this model can then be used to generate arbitrary amounts of synthetic data that will enjoy
the same privacy guarantees, due to the post-processing property of differential privacy. This method can
be used for mixed-type data, that includes binary, categorical, and real valued data.
We introduce a number of new metrics for evaluating the quality of mixed-type synthetic data, particularly
in unsupervised settings. We then evaluate the performance of our DP-auto-GAN algorithm on two datasets
(one all-binary and one mixed-type data) using our new metrics as well as existing metrics from the literature.
We show that DP-auto-GAN performs better than existing techniques in terms of the privacy-accuracy
tradeoff for a wide variety of accuracy metrics.
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A Algorithm Description and Pseudocode of DP-Auto-GAN
In this appendix, we provide the pseudocode of the subroutines in DP-auto-GAN (Algorithm 2): DP-
Trainauto, DPTrainDiscriminator, and TrainGenerator. The complete DP-auto-GAN algorithm is specified
by the architecture and training parameters of the encoder, decoder, generator, and discriminator.
After initial data pre-processing, the DPTrainauto algorithm trains the autoencoder. Details of this
training process are fully specified in Algorithm 3. As noted earlier, the decoder is trained privately by
clipping gradient norm and injecting Gaussian noise in order to obtain the gradient of decoder gθ, while the
gradient of encoder gφ can be used directly as encoder can be trained non-privately.
The second phase of DP-auto-GAN is to train the GAN. As suggested by [20], the discriminator trained
for several iterations per one iteration of generator training. While the discriminator is being trained, the
generator is fixed, and vice-versa. The discriminator and generator training are described in Algorithms
4 (DPTrainDiscriminator) and 5 (TrainGenerator) respectively. Since the discriminator receives real data
samples as input for training, the training is made differentially private by clipping the norm of the gradient
updates, and adding Gaussian noise to the gradient g. The generator does not use any real data in training
(or any functions of the real data that were computed without differential privacy), and hence it can be
trained without any need to clip the gradient norm or to inject noise into the gradient.
Finally, the overall privacy analysis of DP-auto-GAN is done via the RDP accountant for each training,
and composing at the RDP level (as a function of α) as described in Corollary 4. After the sum of the RDP
privacy parameters is obtained (which is a function of α), then for any given fixed δ, we optimize α to get
the best  in Proposition 3. Because the value of (α) obtained from Proposition 3 is a convex function of α
[52, 54], we implement ternary search to efficiently optimize for α.
Proposition 5. DP-auto-GAN trained with differentially private algorithms M1 on the decoder and M2
on the discriminator (and possibly a non-private algorithm on the encoder) achieves differential privacy
guarantee equivalent to that of the composition of M1,M2.
Proof. DP-auto-GAN needs to release only generator and decoder as an output. Releasing the decoder incurs
cost of privacy equal to that of M1. The generator accesses the data only through a discriminator, which
is differentially private by mechanism M2, so releasing the generator has the same privacy loss as M2 from
post-processing. Therefore, releasing both decoder and generator incurs privacy loss of composition of M1
and M2.
Proposition 5 is stated more formally using the RDP notion of privacy (where the privacy parameters
are a function of α) in Corollary 4 in the main body. That corollary follows immediately from Propositions
5 and 2.
B Additional Experimental Details
B.1 Model and Training Specification of Experiment on MIMIC-III data
The autoencoder was trained via Adam with Beta 1 = 0.9, Beta 2 = 0.999, and a learning rate of 0.001.
It was trained on minibatches of size 100 and microbatches of size 1. L2 clipping norm was selected to be
the median L2 norm observed in a non-private training loop, set to 0.8157. The noise multiplier was then
calibrated to achieve the desired privacy guarantee.
The GAN was composed of two neural networks, the generator and the discriminator. The generator was
a simple feed-forward neural network, trained via RMSProp with alpha = 0.99 with a learning rate of 0.001.
The discriminator was also a simple feed-forward neural network, also trained via RMSProp with the same
parameters. The L2 clipping norm of the discriminator was set to 0.35. The pair was trained on minibatches
of size 1,000 and a microbatch size of 1, with 2 updates to the discriminator per 1 update to the generator.
Again, the noise multiplier was then calibrated to achieve desired privacy guarantees.
A serialization of the model architectures used in the experiment can be found below.
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Algorithm 3 DPTrainauto(X, Enφ, Deθ, training parameters)
1: training parameter input: Learning rate η1, number of iteration rounds (or optimization steps) T1,
loss function Lauto, optimization method optimauto batch sampling rate q1 (for the batch expectation
size b1 = q1m), clipping norm C1, noise multiplier ψ1, microbatch size r1
2: goal: train one step of autoencoder (Enφ, Deθ)
3: procedure DPTrainauto
4: B ← SampleBatch(X, q1)
5: Partition B into B1, . . . , Bk each of size r (ignoring the dividend)
6: kˆ ← q1mr . an estimate of k
7: for j = 1 . . . k do
. Both gjφ, g
j
θ can be computed in one backpropagation
8: gjφ, g
j
θ ← ∇φ(Lauto(Deθ(Enφ(Bj)), Bj)),∇θ(Lauto(Deθ(Enφ(Bj)), Bj)
9: gφ ← 1kˆ
∑k
j=1 g
j
φ
10: gθ ← 1kˆ
((∑k
j=1 Clip(g
j
φ, C1)
)
+N (0, C21ψ21I)
)
11: (φ, θ)← optimauto(φ, θ, gφ, gθ, η1)
Algorithm 4 DPTrainDiscriminator(X, Z, Gw, Deθ, Dy, training parameters)
1: training parameter input: Learning rate η3, number of discriminator iterations per generator step
tD, loss function LD, optimization method optimD, batch sampling rate q3 (for the batch expectation
size b3 = q3m), clipping norm C3, noise multiplier ψ3, microbatch size r3
2: goal: train one step of discriminator Dy
3: procedure DPTraindiscriminator
4: B ← SampleBatch(X, q3)
5: Partition B into B1, . . . , Bk each of size r (ignoring the dividend)
6: kˆ ← q1mr . an estimate of k
7: for j = 1 . . . k do
8: {zi}ri=1 ∼ Zr
9: B′ ← {De(Gw(zi))}ri=1
10: gj ← ∇y(LD(Bj , B′, Dy))
. In the case of WGAN,
LD(Bj , B
′, Dy) :=
1
r
∑
b∈Bj
Dy(b)− 1
r
∑
b′∈B′
Dy(b
′)
11: g ← 1
kˆ
((∑k
j=1 Clip(g
j , C3)
)
+N (0, C23ψ23I)
)
12: y ← optimD(y, g, η3)
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Algorithm 5 TrainGenerator(Z,Gw, Deθ, Dy, generator training parameters)
1: training parameter input: Learning rate η2, batch size b2, loss function LG, optimization method
optimG, number of generator iteration rounds (or optimization steps) T2
2: goal: train one step of generator Gw
3: procedure Traingenerator
4: {zi}b2i=1 ∼ Zb2
5: B′ ← {De(Gw(zi))}b2i=1
6: g ← ∇w(LG(B′, Dy))
. In the case of WGAN,
LG(B
′, Dy) := − 1
b2
∑
b′∈B′
Dy(b
′)
7: w ← optimG(w, g, η2)
(encoder): Sequential(
(0): Linear(in-feature=1071, out-feature=128, bias=True)
(1): Tanh()
)
(decoder): Sequential(
(0): Linear(in-feature=128, out-feature=1071, bias=True)
(1): Sigmoid()
)
Generator(
(model): Sequential(
(0): Linear(in-feature=128, out-feature=128)
(1): LeakyReLU(negative-slope=0.2)
(2): Linear(in-feature=128, out-feature=128)
(3): Tanh()
)
)
Discriminator(
(model): Sequential(
(0): Linear(in-feature=1071, out-feature=256, bias=True)
(1): LeakyReLU(negative-slope=0.2)
(2): Linear(in-feature=256, out-feature=1, bias=True) )
)
B.2 Additional MIMIC-III Empirical Results
Here show Figure 7, which is the full version of Figure 3 (dimension-wise prediction for MIMIC-III dataset),
before cleaning the data by removing features with sparse values of 1. As observed in the figure, smaller 
values cause more features the in synthetic data to have a high proportion of 0’s so the logistic regression
classifier trained on these features uniformly outputs 0, causing a default AUROC score of 1/2. A closer
inspection of real data shows that nearly all of those features indeed have very sparse 1’s (appearing less
than 1% of the time). This suggests that with smaller  values, the features that always output as 0 have
been learned accurately with respect to the training set, but may not necessarily generalize to the hold-out
test set.
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(a)  =∞ (b)  = 3.11865 (c)  = 1.27655 (d)  = 0.94145
Figure 7: Full plots of dimension-wise prediction for MIMIC-III dataset
B.3 Model and Training Specification of Experiment on ADULT data
The autoencoder was trained via Adam with Beta 1 = 0.9, Beta 2 = 0.999, and a learning rate of 0.005 for
20,000 minibatches of size 64 and a microbatch size of 1. The L2 clipping norm was selected to be the median
L2 norm observed in a non-private training loop, equal to 0.012. The noise multiplier was then calibrated
to achieve the desired privacy guarantee.
The GAN was composed of two neural networks, the generator and the discriminator. The generator used
a ResNet architecture, adding the output of each block to the output of the following block. It was trained
via RMSProp with alpha = 0.99 with a learning rate of 0.005. The discriminator was a simple feed-forward
neural network with LeakyReLU hidden activation functions, also trained via RMSProp with alpha = 0.99.
The L2 clipping norm of the discriminator was set to 0.022. The pair was trained on 15,000 minibatches
of size 128 and a microbatch size of 1, with 15 updates to the discriminator per 1 update to the generator.
Again, the noise multiplier was then calibrated to achieve the desired privacy guarantee.
A serialization of the model architectures used in the experiment can be found below.
Autoencoder(
(encoder): Sequential(
0: Linear(in-features=106, out-feature=60, bias=True)
(1): LeakyReLU(negative-slope=0.2)
(2): Linear(in-feature=60, out-feature=15, bias=True)
(3): LeakyReLU(negative-slope=0.2)
)
(decoder): Sequential(
(0): Linear(in-feature=15, out-feature=60, bias=True)
(1): LeakyReLU(negative-slope=0.2)
(2): Linear(in-feature=60, out-feature=106, bias=True)
(3): Sigmoid()
)
)
Generator(
(block-0): Sequential(
(0): Linear(in-feature=64, out-feature=64, bias=False)
(1): BatchNorm1d()
(2): LeakyReLU(negative-slope=0.2)
)
(block-1): Sequential(
(0): Linear(in-feature=64, out-feature=64, bias=False)
(1): BatchNorm1d()
(2): LeakyReLU(negative-slope=0.2)
)
(block-2): Sequential(
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(0): Linear(in-feature=64, out-feature=15, bias=False)
(1): BatchNorm1d()
(2): LeakyReLU(negative-slope=0.2)
)
)
Discriminator(
(model): Sequential(
(0): Linear(in-feature=106, out-feature=70, bias=True)
(1): LeakyReLU(negative-slope=0.2)
(2): Linear(in-feature=70, out-feature=35, bias=True)
(3): LeakyReLU(negative-slope=0.2)
(4): Linear(in-feature=35, out-feature=1, bias=True) )
)
C Additional Related Work
C.1 Differentially Private Training of Deep Models
There are numerous works on optimizing the performance of differentially private GANs, including data
partitioning (either by class of labels in supervised setting or a private algorithm) [56, 41, 42, 28, 2, 3, 12];
reducing the number of parameters in deep models [33]; changing the norm clipping for the gradient in DP-
SGD during training [33, 51, 48]; changing parameters of the Gaussian noise used during training [56]; and
using publicly available data to pre-train the private model with a warm start [58, 33]. Clipping gradients
per-layer of models [32, 33] and per-dynamic parameter grouping [58] are also proposed. Additional details
for some of these optimization approaches are given below.
Batch Sampling Three ways are known to sample a batch from data in each optimization step. These
methods are described in [32]; we summarize them here for completeness. The first is to sample each
individual’s data independently with a fixed probability. This sampling procedure is the one used in the
analysis of the subsampled moment accountant in [1, 32] and subsampled RDP composition in [34]. This
RDP composition is publicly available at Tensorflow Privacy [21]. We implement this sampling procedure
and use Tensorflow Privacy to account Renyi Divergence during training. Another sampling policy is to
sample uniformly at random a fixed-size subset of all datapoints. This achieves a different RDP guarantee,
which was analyzed in [54]. Finally, a common subsampling procedure is to shuffle the data via uniformly
random permutation, and take a fixed-size batch of the first k points in shuffled order. The process is
repeated after a pass over all datapoints (an epoch). Although this batch sampling is most common in
practice, no subsampled privacy composition is known in this case for the centralized model.
Hyperparameter Tuning Training deep learning models involves hyperparameter tuning to find good
architecture and optimization parameters. This process is also done differentially privately, and the privacy
budget must be accounted for. Abadi et al. [1] accounts for hyperparameter search using the work of [23].
Beaulieu-Jones et al. [7] uses Report Noisy Max [15] to private select a model with top performance when a
model evaluation metric is known. Some work has also been done to account for selecting high-performance
models without spending much privacy budget [11, 31]. In our experimental work, we omit the privacy
accounting of hyperparameter search, as this is not the focus of our contribution.
C.2 Evaluation Metrics for Synthetic Data
In this section, we review the evaluation schemes for measuring quality of synthetic data and discuss our
contribution of novel metrics in comparison with existing literature. Various evaluation metrics have been
considered in the literature to quantify the quality of synthetic data [10]. Broadly, evaluation metrics can
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be divided into two major categories: supervised and unsupervised. Supervised evaluation metrics are used
when clear distinctions exist between features and labels in the dataset, e.g., for healthcare applications,
whether a person has a disease or not could be a natural label. Unsupervised evaluation metrics are used
when no feature of the data can be decisively termed as a label. For example, a data analyst who wants
to learn a pattern from synthetic data may not know what specific prediction tasks to perform, but rather
wants to explore the data using an unsupervised algorithm such as Principle Component Analysis (PCA).
Unsupervised metrics can then be divided into three broad types: prediction-based, distributional-distance-
based, and qualitative (or visualization-based). We describe supervised evaluation metrics and all three
types of unsupervised evaluation metrics below. Metrics in previous work and our proposed metrics are
summarized in Table 2 in Section 4.
Supervised evaluation metrics. The main aim of generating synthetic data in a supervised setting is
to best understand the relationship between features and labels. A popular metric for such cases is to train
a machine learning model on the synthetic data and report its accuracy on the real test data [55]. Zhang
et al. [58] used inception scores on the image data with classification tasks. Inception scores were proposed in
Salimans et al. [46] for images which measure quality as well as diversity of the generated samples. Another
metric used in Jordon et al. [28] reports whether the accuracy ranking of different machine learning models
trained on the real data is preserved when the same machine learning model is trained on the synthetic
data. Although these metrics are used for classification in the literature, they can be easily generalized to
the regression setting.
Unsupervised evaluation metric, prediction-based. Rather than measuring accuracy by predicting
one particular feature as in supervised-setting, one can predict every individual feature using the rest of
features. The prediction score is therefore created for each single feature, creating a list of dimension- (or
feature-) wise prediction scores. Good synthetic data should have similar dimension-wise prediction scores
to that of the real data. Intuitively, similar dimension-wise prediction shows that synthetic data correctly
captures inter-feature relationships in the real data.
One metric of this type is proposed by Choi et al. [13] for binary data. Although it was originally proposed
for binary data, we extend this to mixed-type data by allowing varieties of predictive models appropriate
for each data type present in the dataset. For each feature, we try predictive models on the real dataset in
order of increasing complexity until a good accuracy score is achieved. For example, to predict a real-valued
feature, we first used a linear classifier and then a neural network predictor. This ensures that a choice of
predictive model is appropriate to the feature. Synthetic data is then evaluated by measuring the accuracy
of the same predictive model (trained on the real data) on the synthetic data. Similarly high accuracy scores
on synthetic data and real data indicates that the synthetic data closely approximates the real data.
Zhang et al. [58] provides an unsupervised Jensen-Shannon score metric which measures the Jensen-
Shannon divergence between the output of a discriminating neural network on the real and synthetic datasets,
and a Bernoulli random variable with 0.5 probability. This metric differs from dimension-wise prediction in
that the predictive model (discriminator) is trained over the whole dataset at once, rather than dimension-
wise, to obtain a score.
Unsupervised evaluation metric, distributional-distance-based. Another way to evaluate the qual-
ity of synthetic data is computing a dimension-wise probability distribution, which was also proposed in Choi
et al. [13] for binary data. This metric compares the marginal distribution of real and synthetic data on each
individual feature. Below we survey other metrics in this class that can extend to mixed-type data.
3-way marginal : Recently, the NIST [38] challenge used a 3-way marginal evaluation metric in which
three random features of the real and synthetic data R,S are used to compute the total variation distance as
a statistical score. This process is repeated a few times and finally, average score is returned. In particular,
values for each of the three features are partitioned in 100 disjoint bins as follows:
BiR,k =
⌊
(Rik −Rk,min) ∗ 100
Rk,max −Rk,min
⌋
and BiS,k =
⌊
(Sik −Rk,min) ∗ 100
Rk,max −Rk,min
⌋
,
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where Rik, S
i
k is the value of i-th datapoint’s k-th feature in datasets R and S, and Rk,min, Rk,max are
respectively the minimum and maximum value of the k-th feature in R. For example, if k = 1, 2, 3 are the
selected features then i-th data points of R and S are put into bins identified by a 3-tuple, (BiR,1, B
i
R,2, B
i
R,3)
and (BiS,1, B
i
S,2, B
i
S,3), respectively.
Let BR,BS be the set of all 3-tuple bins in datasets R and S, and let |B| denote number of datapoints
in 3-tuple bin B, normalized by total number of data points. Then, the 3-way marginal metric reports the
`1-norm of the bin-wise difference of BR and BS as follows:∑
B1∈BR
∑
B2∈BS
I{B1∈BS}I{B2=B1}
∣∣|B1| − |B2|∣∣+ ∑
B1∈BR
(1− I{B1∈BS})|B1|+
∑
B2∈BS
(1− I{B2∈BR})|B2|.
Both aforementioned metrics (dimension-wise probability from [13] and 3-way marginal from [38]) involve
two steps. First, a projection (or a selection of features) of data is specified, and second some statistical
distance or visualization of synthetic and real data in the projected space is computed. Dimension-wise prob-
ability for binary data corresponds to projecting data into each single dimension, and visualizing synthetic
and real distributions in projected space by histograms (for binary data, the histogram can be specified by
one single number: probability of the feature being 1). The 3-way marginal metric first selects a three-
dimensional space specified by three features as a space into which data projected, discretizes the synthetic
and real distributions on that space, then computes a total variation distance between discretized distribu-
tions. Our proposed metrics generalize both steps of designing the metric as follows.
Generalization of Data Projection: One can generalize selection of 3 features (3-way marginal) to any k
features (k-way marginal). However, one can also select k principle components instead of k features. We
distinguish these as k-way feature marginal (projection onto a space spanned by feature dimensions) and
k-way PCA marginal (projection onto a space spanned by principle components of the original dataset).
Intuitively, k-way PCA marginal best compresses the information of the real data into a small k-dimensional
space, and hence is a better candidate for comparing projected distributions.
Generalization of Distributional Distance: Total variation distance can be misleading as it does not
encode any information on the distance between the supports of two distributions. In general, one can define
any metric of choice (optionally with discretization) on two projected distributions, such as Wasserstein
distance which also depends on the distance between the supports of the two distributions.
Distributional Distance: The distance between two distributions can also be computed without any data
projections. Computing an exact statistical score on high-dimensional datasets is likely computationally
hard. However, we can subsample uniformly at random points from two distributions to compute the score
more efficiently, then average this distance over many iterations.
Unsupervised evaluation metric, qualitative. As described above, dimension-wise probability is a
specific application of comparing histograms under binary data. One can plot histograms of each feature
(1-way feature marginal) for inspection. In practice, histogram visualization is particularly helpful when a
feature is strongly skewed, sparse (majority zero), and/or hard to predict well by predictive models. An
example of this occurred when predictive models do not have meaningful predictive accuracy on certain
features of the ADULT dataset, making prediction-based metric inappropriate. Instead inspection of his-
tograms of those features on synthetic and real data (as in Figure 6) indicate that synthetic data replicates
those features well.
In addition, 2-way PCA marginal is a visual representation of data that explains as much variance as
possible in a plane, providing a good trade-off between information and ease of visualization on two datasets.
This visualization can be augmented with a distributional distance of choice over the two distributions on
these two spaces to get a quantitative metric.
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